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ABSTRACT
Did the Muslim Ban Cause Islamophobia? Institutional Versus Individual Prejudice
by
Emma Handte
Advisor: Mucahit Bilici
The Muslim ban is part of a storied American history of Islamophobia, and as such acts
as more of a reflection of members of the population’s individually held beliefs about Muslims
rather than a catalyst for such beliefs. Surveys of Americans on their opinions of Muslims seem
to support this view: a “thermometer” reading of respondents’ views towards Muslims shows
that from 2014 to 2017 to 2019, “cold” or negative opinions of Muslims actually decreased. This
corresponds to a theory of individually directed Islamophobia that is not significantly impacted
by institutional policy changes, such as the Muslim ban. But at the same time that negative
thermometer ratings decreased, hate crimes against Muslims spiked in 2016 and the number of
anti-Muslim hate groups tracked by the Southern Poverty Law Center spiked in 2017. One
possible explanation for this is that although the overall population’s Islamophobia was
decreasing, a small core of individuals with prejudicial attitudes were radicalized and mobilized
by Trump and structural policies like the Muslim ban enacted by Trump. In this way structural
policy might act as a dog whistle to certain segments of the population to radicalize them and
cause them to join hate groups or commit hate crimes. One potential solution to prejudice is
intergroup contact theory, increased contact and familiarity between an ingroup and an outgroup.
For this process to be successful, however, certain conditions must be met for reductions in
prejudice to occur, such as an already extant belief in equality between the groups. It seems
unlikely that these conditions would be met by the radicalized group in which Islamophobia is
rising. Another solution that does not pose the risk that intergroup contact could go wrong or
lead to even more entrenched prejudice is simply teaching factual information about Islam.
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“If you have come here to help me, you are wasting your time. But if you have come because
your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together.” -Lilla Watson
Chapter 1: The Muslim Ban
Introduction
On May 26, 2017 my college classmate, Taliesin Namkai-Meche, was traveling on the
light rail in Portland, Oregon when a man began spewing Islamophobic hatred, shouting that “all
Muslims should die” at two teenaged black girls, one wearing a hijab. Taliesin was one of three
men who jumped up in defense of the girls. Taliesin, Ricky John Best, and Micah David-Cole
Fletcher tried to form a human blockade between the girls and the man yelling a variety of slurs,
and Taliesin said, “You need to get off this train. Please get off this train.” The man then
proceeded to slash Taliesin and the two other men in the neck with a knife. Taliesin, who friends
would affectionately call “Tilly,” who would call you “man” with a laid-back chuckle and a
goofy smile straight out of 1960s Berkeley, who was almost exactly one year out from
graduating college, died after reaching a hospital. His last words were reported to be, “Tell
everyone on this train I love them” (Bernstein, 2017).
In the aftermath of this and many other heinous incidents of Islamophobic violence, many
pointed to the “Trump Effect” as a cause of a rise in hate crimes (Rushin & Edwards, 2018;
Lopez, 2018; Potok, 2017). The Muslim ban was cited as an instigator of specifically
Islamophobic violence. But did the Muslim ban as a legal institution cause a rise in
Islamophobia, both in the forms of discriminatory actions like hate crimes, but also in terms of
individually held prejudices? Or did Trump craft a campaign message and policy plan that drew
on already extant Islamophobic beliefs among the population? Do racist structural policies
inspire a rise in individual hatred?

1

In this thesis, I attempt to answer this set of questions by investigating the relationship
between institutional Islamophobia and individual Islamophobia in the case of the Muslim ban.
As a preliminary note, I am skeptical of the idea that laws in their role as legal institutions inspire
bigotry like Islamophobia. There are several reasons for my skepticism. First, I worry whether it
is desirable to attribute the cause of Islamophobia to government policy. This takes the blame off
of individuals for Islamophobic beliefs and shifts the blame to institutions. While institutions
may certainly be blameworthy for Islamophobic policy, it is important not to lose sight of the
individual component in terms of countering Islamophobia. Second, in terms of the logic
deployed by Islamophobes, their reasoning does not seem to explicitly consist of propositions
like “if my government is targeting Muslims then so should I.” More likely their reasoning
operates exactly along the lines of Taliesin’s murderer, “Muslims are perpetrators of terrorism,
therefore all Muslims should die.” Third, changing government policies will not change the
belief systems of individual Islamophobes. Even if it were the case that government policies
were causing Islamophobic beliefs and actions in individuals, it is certainly not clear that
changing government policy would get rid of those beliefs. It is not enough to change
government policies, the hearts and minds of Americans must be changed. Contact theory, and
the idea that heightened contact with outgroups leads to reduced prejudice could be a promising
way forward here, since for many Americans, their only contact with Muslims is through media
reports that are largely negative (Ahmed and Matthes, 2017). Another potential way to reduce
Islamophobia is teaching people factual information about Islam and Muslims. Changing the law
is not a way to reduce individually held Islamophobic attitudes.
Departing from these considerations in the following discussion of the Muslim ban and
Islamophobia, it will be useful first to lay out the evolution of the Muslim ban to understand its
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reach. Next it will be constructive to examine the text of the Muslim ban and show that it is in
fact the product of a long line of Islamophobia and Orientalism and picks up on themes that have
been peddled in American politics since at least the 19th century. This lends credence to the idea
that the Muslim ban as a law did not create Islamophobia but in fact was a product of already
extant Islamophobia in the population. Following this I will examine both the abstract and
concrete arguments that propose that structural policies like the Muslim ban are the cause of
individual prejudice. Finally I will investigate some data on anti-Muslim hate crimes, hate
groups, and individual attitudes that may shed some light on whether the Muslim ban caused a
surge in Islamophobia.
Statements by Trump Surrounding the Muslim Ban
Statements made by presidential candidate Donald Trump, as well as his associates, bear
on the public’s interpretation of the Muslim ban, namely, that it is a Muslim ban and not simply a
ban on entrants originating from certain Muslim-majority countries. The proposal for a Muslim
ban originated in the aftermath of the December 2, 2015 attack in San Bernardino, California in
which fourteen people were killed by a husband and wife inspired by terrorist groups but who
were not part of a formal cell. On December 7, at a campaign rally in South Carolina, in response
to the mass shooting, Trump stated that he was “calling for a complete and total shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what the
hell is going on.” This proposal was formalized with a statement on his campaign website
(Wang, C., 2017). Notably, the statement was not taken off his campaign website until after the
Executive Order was signed into law, further connecting his campaign statements to his
executive actions. This official campaign platform did not stand alone, many other tweets and
statements by Trump demonized Muslims as an entire group, including a slew of tweets claiming
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things like “Islam hates us,” supporting the creation of a Muslim Registry, and referring to a
“Muslim problem” (MPower Change, 2018).
Following backlash against Trump’s statements against Muslims, he began to speak
instead about targeting geographical regions in an interview with CBS News (Stahl, 2016). Later
he stated, “people were so upset when I used the word Muslim…and I’m okay with that, because
I’m talking territory instead of Muslim” (Todd, 2016). Clearly this shift to putatively be
punishing individual sovereignties rather than a religious group was meant to evade the
unconstitutionality of open religious discrimination in granting immigration benefits. This was
confirmed the day after the first Executive Order was signed when Rudy Giuliani gave an
interview on Fox News where he said that the president told him “Muslim ban…Put a
commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally” (Wang, A., 2017). Notably, lower
courts allowed that statements made outside the text of the Muslim ban warranted injunctions
(Ramahi, 2020). Statements, however, gave way to the law itself, which has had a complicated
series of iterations.
Multiple Iterations of the Muslim Ban
On January 27, 2017, just a week after his inauguration, Trump signed Executive Order
13769 barring the entry of individuals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen
for the next 90 days, barred refugees from all countries from entering for 120 days, and targeted
Syrian refugees specifically by barring their entry indefinitely (“Timeline of the Muslim Ban”).
Hundreds of people were stranded in the middle of their journeys to the United States. One
grotesquely unjust case included Hameed Darwish, who had been a translator for the American
military during the Iraq War and was detained for over 48 hours at JFK airport before the
International Refugee Assistance Project and the ACLU were able to secure his release (Allen,
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2017). Lawyers, protesters, and victims of the ban worked around the clock to counter the
implementation of the first Muslim ban.
By Sunday, federal judges had granted an injunction to stay the deportations of those like
Darwish, who had been detained at the airport or in transit. The challenges to the initial Muslim
ban in court met with initial success and on March 6, 2017 Trump signed an Executive Order
dubbed “Muslim Ban 2.0.” This new version of the original Muslim ban clarified the policy on
green card holders and those who had already been issued visas, which had been a public
relations nightmare for the Trump administration, given the fact that those individuals had
already secured immigration benefits and were still affected by the ban. Iraq was also removed
from the list of banned countries (“Timeline”). This is probably due to such glaring examples
like the case of Darwish, mentioned above, and others who had been translators or who had
served the U.S. military in the Iraq War, and because the banning of Iraqis amounted to a tacit
admission that the U.S. had thoroughly botched so-called “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Even
given these modifications to the initial Muslim ban, courts blocked “Muslim Ban 2.0” before it
was even able to take effect on March 15, 2017 (“Timeline”).
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments in the case against the first iteration
of the Muslim ban on June 27, 2017 it effectively overruled the injunction on parts of the ban,
allowing some provisions in the ban to take effect so that, for example, refugees without a “bona
fide relationship” to a person or entity in the U.S. were unable to enter. As it looked like the
previous iterations would fail judicial scrutiny, Trump issued the third version to the Muslim
ban, Presidential Proclamation 9645: Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting
Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats. This
proclamation simply altered the Executive Order that consisted of Muslim Ban 2.0, since that
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version had been blocked before even taking effect. The alteration in the proclamation, “Muslim
Ban 3.0,” does little to change the substantive nature of the ban as it pertains to Muslims; six of
the countries are Muslim-majority, with North Koreans (suffice it to say there are not too many
Pyongyang to New York flights) and a tiny number of Venezuelans also affected by the ban.
Within a month, Muslim Ban 3.0 had been blocked in court after the state of Hawai’i brought
suit (“Timeline”).
After a number of lower court victories, the favorable rulings turned sour as the Supreme
Court on December 4, 2017 allowed Muslim Ban 3.0 to be reinstated while the case was being
tried. When the Supreme Court ruled on Muslim Ban 3.0 on June 26, 2018, it upheld the ban,
which again barred nationals of Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, North Korea, and
some government employees from Venezuela (“Timeline”). On April 11, 2018, Chad was
removed from the list after it was seen to have improved its information management system
(“Looking Back and Fighting Forward”). There are some exceptions for Iranians and Somalis,
but for the remaining three Muslim-majority countries all immigrant and nonimmigrant
(employment-based) visas are barred (“U.S. Supreme Court Ruling”).
Then, on January 31, 2020, Trump issued an addition to the bans issued in Muslim Ban
3.0, Proclamation 9983 entitled “Proclamation on Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and
Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry.” This ban covers six countries, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan,
Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania. The text of this new ban uses the guise of a periodic
review process of the information-sharing and immigration vetting capabilities of different
countries, and argues that these six new countries do not meet the Department of Homeland
Security’s standards.
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Other evidence would suggest more continuity with the President’s stated aims of
restricting immigration by Muslims. Nigeria, Sudan, and Kyrgyzstan are all Muslim-majority
countries, and Eritrea and Tanzania both have large Muslim populations. Myanmar has notably
engaged in state-sponsored repression and killings of its Muslim-minority population, the
Rohingya. Furthermore, the new ban adds an anti-black racist element to the immigration bans,
given that four of the six countries are African nations. This view is bolstered by statements
made by Trump, where he referred to several African nations as “shithole” countries. He also
allegedly stated in a conversation where he expressed anger about immigration from Nigeria that
Nigerians “would never go back to their huts” if they were allowed to enter the U.S. (Abdelaziz,
2020). This compounds the racism of the earlier bans and adds black Muslims as doubly exposed
to Trump’s racism.
The Text of the Muslim Ban
To test the hypothesis that the Muslim ban in its role as government policy caused
Islamophobia, it’s helpful to look at the actual text of the ban. The text of the ban makes clear
that the ban is actually a product of a long line of Islamophobia and Orientalism and is more
accurately described as picking up on the tropes and dog whistles of Islamophobes than causing
Islamophobia. It’s important to take a hard look at what causes Islamophobia if it is to be
stopped. Looking at the text of the Muslim ban shows that the ban riffs on already formed
prejudices within the population. It’s unlikely that potential Islamophobes are reading the text of
the ban and become persuaded towards Islamophobic beliefs, or are drawing the conclusion, “If
my government is targeting Muslims then so should I.” More likely, the Muslim ban made it
more acceptable to express already held Islamophobic beliefs because of its ability to pick up on
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already formed Islamophobic arguments. These arguments include the delineation of Muslims as
a separate and inferior race, as misogynists, and as persecuting Christians.
The original ban blocked the entry of citizens from seven different Muslim-majority
countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. In just hours after its signing,
thousands showed up at airports around the country to protest. The protests and other actions
showed that segments of the population recognized the Islamophobia imbued in the Muslim ban
by its connection to Trump’s earlier messages on the campaign trail and as president as well as
other extra-textual evidence such as the white supremacist pedigrees of the ban’s authors. Chief
amongst these citations have been the connection between the ban and the Trump campaign
promise to essentially implement a religious bar on Muslims entering the country. Attention was
also focused on the provenance of the ban and the fact that the ban was largely drafted by
Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon (Costa, Hauslohner, & Markon, 2017). Indeed, the extratextual evidence was used as a major legal argument by lawyers challenging the ban in court and
was the main focus of media attention. The text of the ban itself, however, stands as an exquisite
demonstration of Islamophobia in its own right.
To find Islamophobia in the Muslim ban, there is no need to look further than the text of
the ban itself. In the text of the ban, Trump and the authors of the ban identify the supposed
essential attitudes of Muslims to be diametrically opposed to “Western” values where the ban
states, "In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those admitted to this
country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles" (EO 13769, 2017).
The target of this statement is identified in his speeches supporting the banning of all Muslims
from entering the U.S., and through the text of the ban, Trump ascribes to all Muslims a “hostile
attitude” toward American values. Finally, Trump makes clear the hierarchical ordering of
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“American values” and values opposed to those by stating in the ban, "The United States cannot,
and should not, admit those who do not support the Constitution, or those who would place
violent ideologies over American law" (EO 13769, 2017). It is clear that he means for American
law to be placed at the top, while he vilifies Islam as a “violent ideology” making clear that it is
relegated to the lowest position in a hierarchy of essentialized value systems. There are three
premises in these statements that should be delineated: 1) Muslims are an essential and distinct
group; 2) Muslims as a distinct group are fundamentally opposed to “American values”; 3) The
values of Muslims which oppose “American values” are inferior. All of these premises have
historical roots in classical Orientalist thinking and assumptions.
The Muslim ban makes it clear how the blatant Islamophobia found within the text of the
ban is related to ideas that originated in Orientalist work. Maxime Rodinson identifies the trope
of homo islamicus found in Orientalist writings, that is, a separate race of humans identifiable
only by their adherence to Islam. He describes how this idea originated in the 19th century and
lives on today:
And, to the men of the Enlightenment, the ideologues of the French revolution,
the Oriental was, for all his foreign-ness in appearance and dress, above all a man
like anyone else. In the nineteenth century, however, he became something quite
separate, sealed off in his own specificity, yet worthy of a kind of grudging
admiration. This is the origin of the homo islamicus, a notion widely accepted
even today. (Rodinson, 2002, p. 60)
This is how Westerners formulated the idea that Muslims were a different type of human, people
who did not possess the same traits and characteristics that Westerners possessed. Zachary
Lockman explains the development of the trope even more succinctly, “For Rodinson, the term
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homo islamicus (Latin for “Islamic man”) referred to the perception that the Muslim constituted
a distinct type of human being, essentially different from ‘Western man’” (Lockman, 2010, p.
74). Of course, the idea of these two separate groups of people did not exist without the idea that
the two groups could be ranked hierarchically. Lockman explains this aspect of the trope of
homo islamicus by saying, “…there developed a widespread (but of course never universal)
sense that Westerners were fundamentally different from, and culturally superior to, Muslims
and everyone else now defined as non-Western” (Lockman, 2010, p. 74). A final step in the
ossification of the homo islamicus idea was to go beyond the idea that Muslims and nonMuslims were separate peoples, beyond the idea that Westerners were above Muslims, and to
further the theory by suggesting that the Muslim and Western distinct natures were
fundamentally hostile towards each other. This third element is summed up by Lockman when
he says, “…the implicit or explicit premise of much of nineteenth-century Orientalist scholarship
was that there was indeed a homo islamicus, a distinctive “Islamic man” with a more or less
fixed mindset that was fundamentally different from, indeed absolutely opposed to, the mindset
of ‘Western man’”(Lockman, 2010, p. 77).
The fact that these mindsets are supposed to be essentially at odds with each other is key
to analyzing the way that Orientalists perpetuated the idea that there exists this distinct type of
human, homo islamicus. Lockman and Robinson explain successfully how the very same
assumptions made in the text of the Muslim ban are present in a vast survey of Orientalist works:
1) an essential difference; 2) the opposed nature of those essences; and 3) the gradation of those
essences placing Westerners at the top.
When it is made clear that Islamophobia has its roots in the Orientalist depiction of homo
islamicus as a totally distinct, oppositional, and inferior class of humans, Islamophobia can be
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recognized unambiguously as a form of racism operating by its racialization of Muslims.
Rodinson explores the tight-knit relationship between theories about religion, language, and race
that developed the idea of homo islamicus, saying:
As part of the era’s underlying theoretical idealism, the new historians of religion
inculcated the idea that the essence of each civilization is spiritual: religion
permeates and explains every aspect of civilization. These conclusions are also
connected to issues raised by historical and comparative linguistics, as initiated by
Franz Bopp…The result of the work done by Bopp and his followers (which
aroused great interest) was to give to language, indeed to each specific language,
a key rôle. A people was assumed to identify with its language; it could be
defined by its particular linguistic features. If languages could be related to one
another, then a similar relationship could exist between the spirits of different
peoples (Volkgeister), an interconnection on the deepest level. It was held that this
spirit of a people explained all the social features discernible in its history. With
biological evolutionism and the new field of physical anthropology, interest also
turned to the classification of races. Such work gained immediate prestige and
wide acceptance because it adopted the scientific method used in the natural
sciences. As with religion and language, the concept of race was seen as an
essential quality, only in this case, one endowed with a particular strength…the
power of religion, language, and race was magnified beyond all proportion
(Rodinson, 2002, pp. 61-2).
This overwhelming emphasis placed on religion, language, and race lay at the origins of the idea
of homo islamicus. Lockman looks at the prominent Orientalist Ernest Renan and shows the
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conclusion of this emphasis in Renan’s words, “This bent of mind inculcated by the
Mohammedan faith is so strong, that all differences of race and nationality disappear by the fact
of conversion to Islam” (Lockman, 2010, p. 79). The spirit of Islam is purported to be so strong
that it actually supersedes other attributes to become the totalizing identity of Muslims. The
lineage of this viewpoint is clear in the Muslim ban.
While Lockman and Rodinson survey an older generation of Orientalists, the assumptions
are present even in more contemporary writings by Orientalists such as Bernard Lewis, which is
significant because the work of Orientalists like Bernard Lewis carries clout with politicians and
policymakers. In one of his most famous essays, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Lewis parrots the
same message as earlier Orientalists for a powerful audience. Although he couches his language
in qualifiers such as “…part, though by no means all or even most, of the Muslim World…”
(Lewis, 1990) readers cannot help but to be confronted by the fact that the title, and moreover
every other sentence in the article speaks about unqualifiedly all Muslims possessing some sort
of pent-up rage towards “the West.”
The generalization about all Muslims belies the assumption that Muslims form an
identifiable, distinct, homogenous group along the same lines of the assessment of past
Orientalists discussed above, in which Muslims are cast as having distinct mental features. Lewis
easily then moves according to the pattern of Orientalist argumentation to the next step, to
propose that this fundamental difference is also fundamentally opposed. He actually locates this
difference as originating and sustaining from Islam’s very inception contra Christendom, saying,
“the struggle between these rival systems has now lasted for some fourteen centuries. It began
with the advent of Islam, in the seventh century, and has continued virtually to the present
day.”17 The main point of his article, however, is to contend that this opposition is particularly
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significant for its inability to integrate the American separation of church and state into the
supposedly Muslim worldview, to which he devotes the beginning and end of the essay. Lewis’
article is saturated with the view that “American values” like separation of church and state are
superior to any other system, but nowhere is it more clear than when he refers to “a rising tide of
rebellion against Western paramountcy” (Lewis, 1990). The views expressed in “The Roots of
Muslim Rage” can be broken down in a similar manner to those of earlier Orientalists, that of
Muslims as 1) essential; 2) opposed to the “West”; and 3) inferior. The significance of this lies in
the fact that it is well-known that Bernard Lewis was influential in politics, including in the
George W. Bush administration and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, (Dabashi, 2018) and this
genealogy helps to prove that the equally hawkish and conservative Trump administration has
fallen in line behind this example.
This connection between past Orientalists, relatively contemporary Orientalists, and
government policy is significant because the connection does work to show the intellectual
machinations of how the Islamophobia of the ban is not just a fear or hatred of a religion, but that
it casts adherents of Islam as members of a social group with essential mental features. This
makes it clear how other Americans come to racialize Muslims, since they already see Muslims
as a homogenous group with essential mental features at odds with “Western values,” Muslims
are then cast as a different racial group. As Falguni Sheth discusses, racialization is distinct from
religious bigotry because it has nothing to do with religious beliefs and everything to do with
perceived essential characteristics:
What does it mean to discuss the ‘racialization’ of Muslims? Aren’t Muslims a
religious group? As such, isn’t racism an inappropriate term for Islamophobia? It
is true that if what people despised, feared, or hated was the religion of Islam, and
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discriminated, harassed, or persecuted based on the Islamic religion, then this
would be a case of religious discrimination or bigotry, rather than racism.
However, it is also clear that most people, including various national
governments, who engage in policies or acts of discrimination, do not know with
much accuracy what the tenets of Islam are, let alone what Muslims believe
(Sheth, 2017, p. 348).
Prejudice aimed at Muslims then is not based on the actual beliefs and practices of Islam, but
instead features that all those who believe in Islam are supposed to possess. This is what makes
the bigotry aimed at Muslims a process of racialization rather than religious discrimination.
The Orientalist tropes found in the Muslim ban make clear the progression from
supposedly identifying a type termed homo islamicus to racializing Muslims. And it is clear that
this type of racializing happens, not least from within the text of past immigration and
naturalization laws. Between 1790 and 1952 naturalization law required that candidates for
citizenship meet a racial prerequisite, naturalization was only available to “aliens being free
white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent” (Gualtieri,
2009, pp. 61 and 79). For immigrants from greater Syria who wanted to become citizens, then,
the question became whether they were white or not. Sarah Gualtieri describes the contestation
of this question in a series of Immigration Court cases in the early 20th century. At times, the
courts ended up considering the Syrian immigrants to be white, while at other times they
considered Syrians to be of another race and therefore ineligible for citizenship. Recognizing that
there is no “correct” answer to whether immigrants from greater Syria fit in to the constructed
category of whiteness, the mere fact of the question is enough to show that Syrians possessed
some characteristic that caused their race to be contested. The rulings centered on skin tone,
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geographic origin, moral character, and “scientific” theories of racial lineage. Importantly, the
argument that the Syrian community launched in defense of applicants for citizenship who had
been deemed non-white centered around religion and the fact that many of the Syrian immigrants
were Christian. Gualtieri notes the forces at play in pressing Syrians to make this argument,
“Syrians did perceive exclusion from naturalization to mean that they were deficient,
unwelcome, and uncultured. That is why their early arguments for inclusion in the “white race”
revolved around the issue of the contribution of Semitic peoples to the Western world, especially
Western Christendom” (Gualtieri, 2009, p. 69). If they were not perceived as white, Syrians
would not just lose out on citizenship, but also on the privileges afforded to people perceived as
white in early 20th century America. This is why they constructed an argument based on their
membership in the Christian fold. Defense arguments must respond to pressures from without in
order to construct an argument that they feel will be convincing to those who are judging. The
argument that the Syrian community made attempting to persuade courts that they were white on
account of their Christianity reflects the American view that in order to be white a person must
be Christian.
This connection between Christianity and perceptions of belonging is glaringly apparent
in the text of the Muslim ban. The ban makes special exemptions for persecuted religious
minorities, which are meant to be glossed as Christians, stating that the U.S. Refugee Admission
Program should “prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based
persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s
country of nationality” (EO 13769, 2017). The ban goes on to make clear that this prioritizing of
Christians is in agreement with the aims of the United States, saying, “the admission of such
individuals as refugees is in the national interest—including when the person is a religious
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minority in his country of nationality facing religious persecution…” (EO 13769, 2017).
Through the text of the ban, it is made clear that being Christian is as important as ever to people
hoping to receive immigration benefits, and to denial of immigration benefits to Muslims.
The Muslim ban also deploys the guise of feminist rhetoric by making a superficial
reference to “helping” women. This is easily dismissed as a sham, since the ban excludes those it
deems victims of gender-based violence as well as those it deems the perpetrators. The ban
mentions women twice, saying first, “the United States should not admit those who would
engage in acts of bigotry and hatred (including “honor” killings, other forms of violence against
women…”(EO 13769, 2017). Later the ban makes special provisions for reporting statistics on
violence against women, calling for “…information regarding the number and types of acts of
gender-based violence against women, including honor killings, in the United States by foreign
nationals…” (EO 13769, 2017) The ban makes no special arrangements to, for example, expedite
the waiver process for victims of gender-based violence or to expedite the lengthy processes for
women in the U.S. who are victims of gender-based violence to receive immigration benefits
through the Violence Against Women Act. This makes it clear that the sole purpose of including
this language in the text of the Muslim ban is to imply that all Muslim men are perpetrators of
violence against women and that all Muslim women are victims in one form or another of
gender-based violence. This fits into the picture that Europeans created of homo islamicus, that
Muslim women were across the board abused by Muslim men. Lockman explains how
widespread the historical origin of this view was:
But it was much more common to portray Muslim women as terribly oppressed
and subjugated, indeed as little more than slaves, constantly available for the
erotic gratification of oversexed Muslim men. Just as Ottoman sultans and other
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Muslim rulers were said to tyrannize their subjects, so Muslim men were said to
tyrannize their wives and daughters. Not surprisingly, the degraded status of
Muslim women would later be cited as a justification for European intervention
and colonial rule (Lockman, 2010, p. 70)
Continuing this historical view, the ban suggests that gender-based violence is rampant in the
Muslim community and used this as grounds to ban all people from seven Muslim-majority
countries from entering the U.S.
Bernard Lewis, the Orientalist respected in many circles and with the ear of the powerful,
makes comments that provide proof for Lockman’s characterization of the classical Orientalist
viewpoint. He makes claims that in recent years, Muslim women have increased the amount of
freedom they have experienced in relationships and this has stoked the rage of Muslim men:
..the last straw--was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from
emancipated women and rebellious children. It was too much to endure, and the
outbreak of rage against these alien, infidel, and incomprehensible forces that had
subverted his dominance, disrupted his society, and finally violated the sanctuary
of his home was inevitable (Lewis, 1990).
This perfectly captures the Orientalist viewpoint of Muslim women as traditionally subservient,
and furthers the argument to say that any change to this order will provoke uncontrollable rage in
Muslim men. This all from the Republican party’s guru on the Middle East, which explains the
language in the ban echoing Lewis’ contrived concern for Muslim women.
By deploying this language about women, the ban makes reference to a specific
colonialist rhetoric masquerading as feminism. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak sums this up as
“white men saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak, 1994, p. 93) Except here the
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“saving” consists of preventing them from entering the U.S. Saba Mahmood identifies this
outdated feminist ideology as “repeating the errors of pre-1970s Orientalist scholarship that
defined Middle Eastern women as passive submissive Others, bereft of the enlightened
consciousness of their “Western sisters,” and hence doomed to live lives of servile submission to
men” (Mahmood, 2005, p. 15). This conceit trots out the same ideas of Western superiority that
were identified earlier as an assumption in the misguided Orientalist assumptions. Trump’s use
of this proto-feminist ideology just shows how dangerous the idea is that Muslim women are
bereft of any agency and at the mercy of their tyrannical husbands and fathers. This makes it
clear that feminists and anyone working against Islamophobia needs to work to remove the
concept of the non-agentive, victimized Muslim woman from their ideological assumptions.
Dissecting the text of the Muslim ban is essential to going beyond just Islamophobic
motivations and showing that the actual machinery of the Muslim ban is Islamophobic. It is also
essential to understanding what the Executive Branch believed would both appeal to supporters
of the President as a (passably) legally acceptable form of Islamophobia as well as what would
be able to survive in the courts. By parsing different elements of the ban, it becomes clear that
the notion of the homo islamicus lies at its base, as well as a racialization of Muslims as nonwhites, and a deployment of a problematic feminism to “save” Muslim women.
Chapter 2: Arguments that Islamophobia is Caused by Institutional Structures
The idea of institutional racism comes from literature on anti-black racism and was
coined by Kwame Ture (Stokely Carmichael) and Charles V. Hamilton (Miles, 1999). They
distinguish between overt, individual racism and covert, institutional racism. They give examples
of the two different types of racism:
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When white terrorists bomb a black church and kill five black children, this is an act of
individual racism, widely deplored by most segments of the society. But when in that
same city—Birmingham, Alabama—five hundred black babies die each year because of
the lack of proper food, shelter, and medical facilities, and thousands more are destroyed
and maimed physically, emotionally, and intellectually because of conditions of poverty
and discrimination in the black community, that is a function of institutional racism.
(Ture & Hamilton, 1992, p. 2)
Institutional racism need not be covert, however, it just needs to be implemented by societal
forces rather than an individual. In this way the Muslim ban can be seen as an example of
institutional racism.
Theoreticians argue both abstractly and concretely about different forms of institutional
racism and the ways in which it causes individual racism. Many of the authors who write about
the more concrete forms of Islamophobic government policy causing private animus are
influenced by the authors who talk about this phenomenon in an abstract way. These authors who
give the phenomenon an abstract treatment refer to Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben, and
Achille Mbembe.
One of Foucault’s basic points in his discussion of biopower is that the exercise of
biopower dehumanizes individuals, in a description that accurately sums up how the Muslim ban
dehumanizes Muslims. In a pithy summation, Foucault says, “For millennia, man remained what
he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern
man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault,
2010, p. 265). Foucault describes accurately how modern politics has served to debase Muslims
of their individual human qualities and subsume them all wholesale under the appellation of
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terrorists. He also accurately describes the mechanism through which Muslims are dehumanized,
saying that sovereign power shifted from the power to decide life and death to the power to
regulate different elements of population control and management:
During the classical period, there was a rapid development of various
disciplines—universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops; there was also
the emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, of the
problems of birth rate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration. Hence
there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the
subjugation of bodies and control of populations, marking the beginning of an era
of “bio-power.” (Foucault, 2010, p. 262)
Management of migration became one of the main avenues for the state to exert disciplinary
control over its populations when it was threatened. This sheds light on the post-9/11 creation of
the Department of Homeland Security and all of its apparatuses. Foucault’s original abstract
account of the state’s evolution from meting out life and death to exercising the same mandates
through the disciplinary control of populations is used by many authors explaining the
relationship between state-sponsored Islamophobia and private hate.
Another theorist who emphasizes the importance of the state in creating the conditions
for hatred and prejudice is Giorgio Agamben. He takes up the task of examining Nazi political
theorist Carl Schmitt’s ideas on the state exception as an ambiguous zone between law and
political fact, its historical roots in Roman law, and its application today in the “war on terror.”
Agamben identifies the twelve years of the Third Reich as a state of exception and compares it to
post-9/11 laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act and the Military Order called Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Agamben, 2005).
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These laws instituted indefinite detention, trial by military commissions as opposed to more
legally standard military tribunals, the ability to take into custody any alien suspected of
engaging in activities that threatened national security, the treatment of members of the Taliban
not as prisoners of war, as mandated by the Geneva Conventions, etc. The effect of this is to
produce a “legally unnamable and unclassifiable being” (Agamben, 2005, p. 3). Agamben’s
discussion of the post-9/11 transition into a state of exception is significant in that it identifies the
locus of the dehumanization of what the state takes to be its enemies in the letter of the law, or
ambiguously legal apparatuses.
Achille Mbembe examines both the notion of biopower and the state of exception in his
development of these ideas into the theory of necropolitics, which he defines as “contemporary
forms of subjugation of life to the power of death” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 39). Necropolitics
describes the late modern use of political power to control who lives and who dies. Mbembe
contends that who lives and who dies is calculated by state power, saying, “sovereignty means
the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not”
(Mbembe, 2003, p. 27). In the globalized wars of the late-modern era, this is inevitably defined
in a racial or racialized way, so that the state’s enemy of the terrorist is conflated with the Arab
or the Muslim, since, “In the economy of biopower, the function of racism is to regulate the
distribution of death and to make possible the murderous functions of the state” (Mbembe, 2003,
p. 17). And it is ironic that the state takes the terrorist as its enemy because it is the functioning
of necropolitics that has channeled a small fraction of people to commit violence, as Mbembe
argues, “under conditions of necropower, the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and
redemption, martyrdom and freedom are blurred” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 39). Choosing death and to
kill others along the way is a path to freedom and agency in the system of necropower. Although
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Mbembe’s main point seems to be the explanation of the draw towards suicide bombing in world
system of necropolitics, his theory rests on the premise that racism is propagated by the state as a
tool of control in meting out death and life.
Besides these more abstract formulations of the idea that racism like Islamophobia is
caused by the state, there are authors who examine more concrete examples of how the
government is the root of Islamophobia. Falguni Sheth uses Foucault’s idea of biopower to
explain how the government uses the tool of race to divide populations and make Muslims a
target of animus by individual members of society. This legislation is what racializes Muslims
and creates private animus according to Sheth:
I want to argue for a functional account of race, in which laws and public policies are
used to render certain populations vulnerable, possibly criminalizing them, rendering
them without legal or political protection, and creating a hostile environment in which
those populations are vilified and susceptible to political, social, and cultural targeting by
the larger society around them. (Sheth, 2017, p. 342)
This account places the cause of Islamophobia squarely on government policy.
Other authors make similar concrete arguments about the government policies
intertwined with Islamophobia. In his definition and description of Islamophobia, Khaled
Beydoun describes the way that institutional racism in the form of structural policy causes
individual Islamophobia. He first defines Islamophobia as:
The presumption that Islam is inherently violent, alien, and inassimilable. Combined with
this is the belief that expressions of Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for
terrorism…Islamophobia is rooted in understandings of Islam as civilization’s antithesis
and perpetuated by government structures and private citizens. Finally, this piece asserts
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that Islamophobia is also a process—namely, the dialectic by which state policies
targeting Muslims endorse prevailing stereotypes, and, in turn, embolden private animus
toward Muslim subjects. (Beydoun, 2016, p. 111)
After defining Islamophobia as both individual and institutional perpetuation of the idea that
Islam is equated with terrorism, Beydoun goes on to explain the workings of the prejudice:
Islamophobia therefore has three dimensions: structural policy, private animus, and the
dialectical process by which the former legitimizes and mobilizes the latent and patent
bigotry of individuals and private actors. The result is far more complex than mere “fear
and dislike” of Islam and Muslims. (Beydoun, 2016, p. 111)
On Beydoun’s account, there exists individual Islamophobia, institutional Islamophobia, and the
process by which institutional Islamophobia causes individual Islamophobia. This would suggest
that the Muslim ban caused a rise in individual Islamophobia, but below I explore that the reality
is much more complex.
Chapter 3: Assessing the Impact of the Muslim Ban on Islamophobia
Based on the above abstract and concrete arguments about what causes individual
Islamophobia, we would expect to see that the Muslim ban caused a rise in private Islamophobia.
One attempt to measure the overall Islamophobia within the population is the Islamophobia
Index, created by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU). Unfortunately, this
index has only measured sentiment for the past two years, 2018 and 2019, so does not include
any changes that might have occurred as a result of the Muslim ban, but the changes found from
2018 to 2019 are significant. The Islamophobia Index is a scale from 0 to 100 and is based on
respondents indicating how much they agree or disagree, 1 meaning “strongly disagree” and 5
meaning “strongly agree,” with the following statements:
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1. Most Muslims living in the United States are more prone to violence than other
people.
2. Most Muslims living in the United States discriminate against women.
3. Most Muslims living in the United States are hostile to the United States.
4. Most Muslims living in the United States are less civilized than other people.
5. Most Muslims living in the United States are partially responsible for acts of violence
carried out by other Muslims. (Mogahed and Mahmood, 2019, p. 19)
ISPU research linked those variables as corresponding to political alignment with anti-Muslim
policies. This is significant in that it measures different sentiments that are components of
Islamophobia and attempts to break down the different specific beliefs involved in the bigotry.
One issue with the surveyed questions might be that the questions ask about the respondent’s
attitudes toward Muslims living in the United States. The respondent might think that Muslims
living in the U.S. are in some way different from Muslims who live abroad, for example that
Muslims living abroad are either more or less hostile to the U.S. Islamophobia covers bigotry
towards both Muslims in the U.S. and Muslims abroad, so it’s not clear why the respondents’
attitudes towards Muslims living in the U.S. are singled out for an index covering Islamophobia
in general. Furthermore, there are other elements of Islamophobia that may not be captured here,
for example, the belief that the values of Islam are incompatible with democracy, or that most
Muslims support the compulsory institution of shari’ah. It’s difficult to parse out the different
components of all Islamophobic beliefs.
Regardless, based on these measures, Mogahed and Mahmood found that the
Islamophobia Index had increased from 24 points to 28 points from 2018 to 2019. They found
that besides Muslims themselves, Jews had the lowest scores on the Islamophobia Index, while
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white Evangelicals had the highest scores corresponding with the highest amount of
Islamophobia (Mogahed & Mahmood, 2019).
Although the ISPU study showed that Islamophobia rose from 2018 to 2019, these results
are not universal. According to data obtained from Pew Research, along some measures,
Islamophobic attitudes may be falling. Pew asked a question that potentially more cleanly sums
up Islamophobic attitudes than more murky questions that ISPU used to dissect the elements of
Islamophobia, namely a simple question that asks the respondent to rate their feelings towards
Muslims on a scale from 0 (very cold) to 100 (very warm):
We’d like to get your feelings toward a number of groups on a feeling thermometer. A
rating of zero degrees means you feel as cold and negative as possible. A rating of 100
degrees means you feel as warm and positive as possible. You would rate the group at 50
degrees if you don’t feel particularly positive or negative toward the group…Muslims
(Pew Research Center, 2019)
This question is not without issues, either. While it’s clear that someone given no other
information about a Muslim rating their feelings below 50 (in the cold region of the
“thermometer”) could reasonably constitute an Islamophobic sentiment, it’s not clear whether
above 50 exclusively, or 50 and above inclusively constitutes non-Islamophobic attitudes. Would
the baseline feeling towards Muslims be 50, not particularly positive or negative? Compounding
this issue is how Pew Research compiled their results, which they divide into thirds, namely they
report the percentage of respondents who gave 0 to 33 as their answers, 34 to 66, and 67 to 100.
The percentage of their respondents who gave their answer in the 34 to 66 range therefore
includes people who felt on some level cold or negative, between 33 and 49, towards Muslims as
well as those who answered between 50 and 66, namely on the warmer end of the spectrum. For
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example, the results of the poll taken between February 4, 2019 and February 19, 2019 were
given as such:
Figure 1. Attitudes Towards Muslims in 2019

Attitudes Towards Muslims in 2019
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Again, neutral feelings represented by a response of 50 are lumped in with both cold feelings
down to 33 and warm feelings up to 66. However, the data contain significant information at the
extremes of the spectrum. There were a significant percentage of respondents who reported very
cold feelings towards Muslims, 25% of those who responded to the poll. This is a larger
percentage than people who felt very warm feelings towards Muslims, which was just 22%. For
comparison, this is very different from respondents’ feelings towards mainline, i.e. nonEvangelical, Protestants. Just 11% had very cold feelings towards mainline Protestants and 36%
had very warm feelings towards the group. Below are the results of the 2019 survey of feelings
towards mainline Protestants:
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Figure 2. Attitudes Towards Mainline Protestants in 2019
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More respondents felt very warm feelings towards mainline Protestants than felt very cold
feelings. By comparison, respondents felt more anti-Muslim sentiment than anti-Protestant
sentiment in 2019. In fact, of all the questions asking for a thermometer rating of religious
groups, Muslims had the highest percentage of cold thermometer ratings, while their men
thermometer rating, 49, was the same as that for atheists (Pew Research Center, 2019).
The Pew Research Center asked respondents this same question three times, between
February 4 and February 19, 2019, between January 9 and January 23, 2017, and between May
30 and June 30, 2014. Importantly, the polling in 2017 ended just four days before the Muslim
ban was signed into law. The results of the poll are shown below:
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Figure 3. Attitudes Towards Muslims in 2014, 2017, and 2019
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Warm feelings towards Muslims were actually at their lowest of the three polls in 2014 at 16%,
their highest in 2017 at 25%, and fell again in 2019 at 22%, but still above 2014-levels (Pew
Research Center, 2017; 2014). Lukewarm feelings, which may represent the colder or warmer
feelings, but likely include many responses in the middle at 50, reached their peak in 2019 at
51% of respondents. The most surprising section of the data are cold feelings, however, which
fell steadily from 2014 to 2019:

28

Figure 4. Cold Feelings Towards Muslims in 2014, 2017, and 2019
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Cold feelings towards Muslims fell from a high of 41% in 2014, to 30% in 2017 just before the
Muslim ban but after Trump’s election, and fell further to 25% in 2019. It’s possible that this
suggests that Islamophobic sentiments have been falling based on self-reported attitudes towards
Muslims.
There is reason to suspect self-reported attitudes towards different religious groups,
however. Respondents may be reluctant to share their true feelings to those administering polls,
particularly if their name, phone number, email address, or other identifying information is
involved. Furthermore, respondents may be unaware of unconscious biases. Finally, while
bigotry in the general population may be falling, those with “cold” self-reported thermometer
ratings may be becoming more radicalized in their negative attitudes. Hate crime statistics may
provide a different perspective on prejudice than merely self-reported attitudes.
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The data about self-reported attitudes towards Jews and anti-Semitic hate crimes are
telling in this regard. In the three thermometer polls, Jews were the most warmly rated religious
group (Pew Research Center, 2014; 2017; 2019). However, for all three years the highest number
of anti-religious hate crimes were by far anti-Jewish hate crimes (FBI, 2018). So while the
general population may profess warm feelings towards Jews, either these are false or selfdeceptive professions, or the minority with negative attitudes towards Jews are far more potent
than those with negative feelings towards other religious groups. This is all to suggest that hate
crime statistics could potentially be more reliable in measuring bias than self-reported attitudes.
Edwards and Rushin (2018) showed that Trump’s election caused a spike in hate crimes.
They showed that it caused the largest spike in hate crimes since 2001 and consider two different
theories for why Trump’s election caused a rise in hate crimes. One theory they call the
Dangerous Rhetoric Theory, and the other they call the Validation Theory. The Dangerous
Rhetoric Theory explains the rise in hate crimes simply as a function of increased extreme
political speech and its spread through the media. Essentially, along this theory’s reasoning, it
wouldn’t have mattered if Donald Trump were actually elected, the fact that his extreme political
speech was publicized was enough to have an effect on hate crimes. The Validation Theory, on
the other hand, places the importance on Trump’s actual election in the spike in hate crimes.
Along this theory, his election validated the bigotry of Americans and spurred people to act on
those beliefs to commit hate crimes. Ultimately, Edwards and Rushin cautiously propose that the
data seem to fit the Validation Theory more squarely than Dangerous Rhetoric Theory.
Validation Theory is one version of the theory that institutional racism spurs individual racism,
namely that institutional racism validates and emboldens individuals to commit discriminatory
criminal acts. But what does the data on specifically Islamophobic hate crimes support this
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theory? And how does it fit in to the trend shown by the decreasing cold “thermometer” readings
about self-reported attitudes about Muslims?
The hate crime data for Islamophobic hate crimes, which includes crimes against persons,
property, or society motivated by bias against Muslims, shows a different trend than the selfreported attitudes of the “thermometer” reports. Hate crimes rose from their 2014 levels to reach
a peak of 307 reported hate crimes against Muslims in 2016 only to fall again through 2018.
Figure 5. Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes as Reported to the FBI 2014-2018
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Although the thermometer reports did not include a reading for the years 2015, 2016, or 2018,
the trend still differs significantly in that the number of hate crimes was lower in 2014 at 154
offenses than 2017, in which there were 273 offenses (FBI, 2018).
Similarly, statistics about the number of anti-Muslim hate groups tracked by the Southern
Poverty Law Center (SPLC) show a substantial increase from 2014 (SPLC, 2019).
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Figure 6. Anti-Muslim Hate Groups Tracked by the Southern Poverty Law Center 2014-2019
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In this case the height is in 2017, but this tracks with the differences between a hate crime and a
hate group, the former takes little planning and can be committed often in the moment without
premeditation, whereas the former requires some planning and organization. Similarly, numbers
did not reduce as rapidly following 2017 as they increased from 2015 to 2016, but a hate group is
an ongoing enterprise whereas a hate crime is a single event that does not persist.
So how to square the diminishing negative “thermometer” ratings on Muslims with the
spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes as well as hate groups around Trump’s election and the
implementation of the Muslim ban? One explanation is just that self-reports of prejudice are just
not reliable for a variety of reasons. Another explanation, however, could be termed the
Prejudices Becoming More Radical Theory. This explanation is that while the general population
became less Islamophobic from 2014 to 2019, the core of the group who might have registered
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“cold” feelings towards Muslims and not have been part of the attrition from that rating in later
years may have become increasingly radicalized. This would suggest that Islamophobic policies
don not cause Islamophobia for the general population. But for a subset of people who already
hold prejudices, their beliefs are radicalized to join hate groups and commit hate crimes. This is
one potential explanation for why cold feelings towards Muslims fell from 2014 to 2019 while
hate crimes and number of hate groups rose.
Potential Ways to Reduce Islamophobia
The ISPU proposes several responses to Islamophobia in their report on the Islamophobia
Index. Chief amongst them is contact theory, the idea that contact between an ingroup and an
outgroup about which prejudicial beliefs are held has the potential to reduce prejudice in the
ingroup (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Indeed, the ISPU found that not only knowing a Muslim
individual, but knowing a Muslim individual as a close friend led to a lower score on the
Islamophobia index (ISPU, 2019). However, intergroup contact theory does not succeed in every
situation. Instances of flaring prejudice and discrimination against an outgroup in a situation like
a hate crime are glaring examples of the failings of intergroup contact where simply an encounter
is enough to trigger bigotry. Certain conditions must be met in order for intergroup contact to
lead to reduced prejudice. These conditions have been posited as:
1. Equal group status in the situation
2. Common goals
3. Intergroup cooperation
4. Support of authorities, law, or custom (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005, pp. 264-265)
Essentially, both the ingroup and the outgroup must view themselves as being equals in the
situation of contact, the members of the groups must share a common endeavor, as well as
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cooperating rather than competing in this endeavor, and both groups must accept sanctions by
authorities. The conditions must be right for intergroup contact theory to succeed, and a member
of the ingroup who already holds a negative opinion of an outgroup before contact certainly does
not meet the first condition of belief in equal status. Supporting this, the ISPU found that
knowing a Muslim may turn a neutral opinion favorable, but does less to change negative
opinions (ISPU, 2019).
The status of Islamophobia in America today does not bode well for contact theory. Cold,
negative feelings in the general population towards Muslims fell, but hate crimes and
membership in hate groups peaked. This suggests that those with negative feelings towards
Muslims became more radicalized in their views. These ingroup members with radical attitudes
towards Muslims are the exact type of individuals who may not meet the conditions to improve
prejudicial attitudes based on contact with outgroup members.
Contact theory does not seem to provide robust enough potential for combatting
Islamophobia among the segment of the population that has become more deeply entrenched in
their bigoted views. Beyond intergroup contact, the ISPU found that knowing something about
Islam was even more closely associated with lower Islamophobia than knowing a Muslim
personally (ISPU, 2019). Teaching the public factual information about Islam and Muslims has
potential as a way forward for combatting Islamophobia. Demystifying Islam has less potential
than intergroup contact theory to go sour where the four conditions necessary for successful
intergroup contact are not met.
Conclusion
The Muslim ban is part of a storied American history of Islamophobia, and as such acts
as more of a reflection of members of the population’s individually held beliefs about Muslims
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rather than a catalyst for such beliefs. Surveys of Americans on their opinions of Muslims seem
to support this view: a “thermometer” reading of respondents’ views towards Muslims shows
that from 2014 to 2017 to 2019, “cold” or negative opinions of Muslims actually decreased. This
corresponds to a theory of individually directed Islamophobia that is not significantly impacted
by institutional policy changes, such as the Muslim ban. But at the same time that negative
thermometer ratings decreased, hate crimes against Muslims spiked in 2016 and the number of
anti-Muslim hate groups tracked by the Southern Poverty Law Center spiked in 2017. One
possible explanation for this is that although the overall population’s Islamophobia was
decreasing, a small core of individuals with prejudicial attitudes were radicalized and mobilized
by Trump and structural policies like the Muslim ban enacted by Trump. In this way structural
policy might act as a dog whistle to certain segments of the population to radicalize them and
cause them to join hate groups or commit hate crimes. One potential solution to prejudice is
intergroup contact theory, very simply increased contact and familiarity between an ingroup and
an outgroup. For this process to be successful, however, certain conditions must be met for
reductions in prejudice to occur, such as an already extant belief in equality between the groups.
It seems unlikely that these conditions would be met by the radicalized group in which
Islamophobia is rising. Another solution that does not pose the risk that intergroup contact could
go wrong or lead to even more entrenched prejudice is simply teaching factual information about
Islam.

35

References
Abdelaziz, R. (2020, February 10). By targeting Africans, Trump’s Muslim ban is even more
racist. Huffington Post. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/by-targeting-africans-trumpsmuslim-ban-is-even-more-racist_n_5e3dd9a7c5b6b70886ffed25
Agamben, G. (2005). State of exception. (K. Attell, Trans.). The University of Chicago Press.
Ahmed, S. & Matthes, J. Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to 2015: A
meta-analysis. International Communication Gazette, 79(3), 219-244.
Allen, J. & O’Brien, B. (2017, January 29). How Trump’s abrupt immigration ban sowed
confusion at airports, agencies. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trumpimmigration-confusion-idUSKBN15D07S
Bernstein, M. (2017, May 29). Portland MAX hero’s last words: Tell everyone on this train I
love them. The Oregonian.
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2017/05/max_heros_last_words_tell_ever.html#inc
art_big-photo
Beydoun, K. A. (2016). Islamophobia: Towards a legal definition and framework. Columbia Law
Review Online, 116, 108-125.
Costa, R., Hauslohner, A., & Markon, J. (2017, January 25). Trump to sign Executive Orders
enabling construction of proposed border wall and targeting sanctuary cities. The
Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/presidenttrump-is-planning-to-sign-executive-orders-on-immigration-thisweek/2017/01/24/aba22b7a-e287-11e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html

36

Dabashi, H. (2018, May 28). Alas, poor Bernard Lewis, a fellow of infinite jest. Al Jazeera.
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/alas-poor-bernard-lewis-fellow-infinite-jest180528112404489.html
Edwards, G. S. & Rushin, S. (2018). The effect of President Trump’s election on hate crimes.
Social Science Research Network.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3102652
Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017: Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry
into the United States. Executive Office of the President. 82 FR 8977-8982.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2018). Hate Crime. U.S. Department of Justice.
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/
Foucault, M. (2010). “Right of death and power over life.” In P. Rabinow (Ed.), The Foucault
reader (pp. 258-272). Vintage Books.
Gualtieri, S. A. (2009). Between Arab and white: Race and ethnicity in the early Syrian
American diaspora. University of California Press.
Lewis, B. (1990, September). The roots of Muslim rage. The Atlantic.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslimrage/304643/
Lockman, Z. (2010). Contending visions of the Middle East: The history and politics of
Orientalism. Cambridge University Press.
Lopez, G. (2019, July 15). Donald Trump’s long history of racism, from the 1970s to 2019. Vox.
https://www.vox.com/2016/7/25/12270880/donald-trump-racist-racism-history
Mahmood, S. (2005) Politics of Piety: Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. Princeton
University Press.

37

Mbembe, A. (2003). “Necropolitics.” Public Culture 15, no. 1: 11-40.
Miles, R. (1999). Racism as a concept. In M. Bulmer and J. Solomos (Eds.), Racism. Oxford
University Press.
Mogahed, D. & Mahmood, A. (2019). American Muslim poll 2019: Predicting and preventing
Islamophobia. Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.
MPower Change. (2018, April 19). 86 times Donald Trump displayed or promoted
Islamophobia. Medium. https://medium.com/nilc/86-times-donald-trump-displayed-orpromoted-islamophobia-49e67584ac10
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact
theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90(5), 751–783.
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2005). Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis: Its history and
influence. In J. F. Davidio, P. Glick, and L. A. Rudman (Eds.), On the nature of
prejudice: Fifty years after Allport (pp. 262-277). Blackwell Publishing.
Pew Research Center. (2019, July 23). What Americans know about religion.
https://www.pewforum.org/2019/07/23/what-americans-know-about-religion/
Pew Research Center. (2017, February 15). Americans express increasingly warm feelings
towards religious groups. https://www.pewforum.org/2017/02/15/americans-expressincreasingly-warm-feelings-toward-religious-groups/
Pew Research Center. (2014, July 16). How Americans feel about religious groups.
https://www.pewforum.org/2014/07/16/how-americans-feel-about-religious-groups/
Potok, M. (2017) The Trump effect. Southern Poverty Law Center.
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/trump-effect

38

Ramahi, Z. (2020). The Muslim ban cases: A lost opportunity for the court and a lesson for the
future. California Law Review, 108(2), 557-586.
Rodinson, M. (2002). Europe and the mystique of Islam. (R. Veinus, Trans.). I.B. Tauris & Co
Ltd. (Original work published 1980).
Sheth, F. (2017). The racialization of Muslims in the post-9/11 United States. In N. Zack (Ed.),
The Oxford handbook of philosophy and race (pp. 342-351). Oxford University Press.
Spivak, G. C. (1994). Can the subaltern speak? In P. Williams and L. Chrisman (Eds.), Colonial
discourse and post-colonial theory: A reader (pp. 66-111). Columbia University Press.
Stahl, L. (2016, July 17). The Republican ticket: Trump and Pence. CBS News.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-trump-pence-republican-ticket/
Southern Poverty Law Center. (2019). Hate map. https://www.splcenter.org/hatemap?ideology=anti-muslim
“Timeline of the Muslim Ban.” (2018). ACLU of Washington, https://www.acluwa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban.
Todd, C. (2016, July 24). Meet the press-July 24, 2016. NBC News.
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706
Ture, K. & Hamilton, C. V. (1992). Black power: The politics of liberation. Vintage Books.
“U.S. Supreme Court Ruling on Muslim Ban 3.0: What You Need to Know.” Asian Law Caucus
and Council on American-Islamic Relations, https://www.advancingjustice-alc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/KYR-for-SCOTUS-Muslim-Ban-Decision.pdf
Wang, A. (2017, January 29). Trump asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani says, and ordered a
commission to do it ‘legally.’ The Washington Post.

39

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-amuslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/
Wang, C. (2017, May 8). Trump website takes down Muslim ban statement after reporter grills
Spicer in briefing. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/08/trump-website-takes-downmuslim-ban-statement-after-reporter-grills-spicer-in-briefing.html

40

